Containing risk in the new global financial landscape by James Bullard




Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
19thAnnual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on the 
State of the U.S. and World Economies
After the Crisis: Planning a New Financial Structure
New York City
15 April 2010
Any opinions expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee participants.OVERVIEW ORIGINS SHADOW BANKING A “WALL STREET ONLY” FED A BROAD FED ROLE PROPOSALS CONCLUSIONS
TOPICS FOR TODAY
Main idea: Try to assess the state of the regulatory reform debate.
Consider some of the origins of the ﬁnancial crisis.
Ask two questions of current ﬁnancial regulatory reform
proposals:
Could these proposals have prevented the most recent ﬁnancial
crisis?
Would they prevent a future, unknowable crisis?OVERVIEW ORIGINS SHADOW BANKING A “WALL STREET ONLY” FED A BROAD FED ROLE PROPOSALS CONCLUSIONS
PREVIEW OF MAIN CONCLUSIONS
Only a few of the most recent ﬁnancial regulatory reform
proposals are likely to help prevent future crises.
As the nation’s lender of last resort, the Fed will be at the center
of managing any future ﬁnancial crisis.
This argues for the Fed playing the lead role in the new
regulatory structure.
A Fed with appropriately broad regulatory authority provides the
nation with the best chance of avoiding a future crisis.OVERVIEW ORIGINS SHADOW BANKING A “WALL STREET ONLY” FED A BROAD FED ROLE PROPOSALS CONCLUSIONS
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ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS
Fundamentally, the crisis was caused by a failure of ﬁnancial
engineering.
First, a securitization boom.
Second, a housing boom followed by a dramatic decline in housing
prices.
Securitized products did not take the possibility of a decline in
housing prices into account appropriately.
It could have been done correctly. There is nothing wrong with
securitization per se.
Securitized paper was worth much less than most anticipated, and
it was held by ﬁnancial entities worldwide, who had to accept
large losses.
Firms were naturally unwilling to reveal losses.
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THE PANIC PRODUCED RUN-LIKE EVENTS
The crisis caused runs in the shadow banking sector.
These are institutions that did not take deposits and so were not
thought to be susceptible to a run.
The solution to bank runs is deposit insurance plus prudential
regulation.
Reserve requirements are not enough.
Deposit insurance removes the incentives of depositors to run.
There is no analog of deposit insurance for shadow banks.
Capital requirements, the analog of reserve requirements, are not
enough.
I do not see this issue being addressed.
I think the nation will remain vulnerable to runs in the shadow
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ALLOWING SUDDEN FAILURE
The crisis showed that large ﬁnancial institutions worldwide
were “too big to fail.” (TBTF)
We can let large ﬁnancial ﬁrms fail suddenly ...
... but then global panic ensues.
Reform proposals have to face this fact.
Chicago-style vows to not intervene in the future will not solve this
problem.
Vows like this are not credible. (See Feldman and Stern, 2004).
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SUMMARY OF THE TABLE
As the crisis started in Fall 2007, 20 ﬁrms accounted for about 80
percent of ﬁnancial sector assets in the U.S.
About 1/3 of this total was in bank holding companies.
About 2/3 was non-bank ﬁnancials: Government-sponsored
enterprises (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), investment banks,
insurance companies, and thrifts.
A large fraction of ﬁnancial assets in U.S.-based ﬁrms were not in
the bank regulatory system, and not under the regulatory
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NEARLY ALL FIRMS WERE AFFECTED
The non-bank ﬁnancials in the table provide a who’s-who of the
most nettlesome entities during the crisis!
All of these ﬁrms faced severe stress during the crisis, regardless of the
type of ﬁrm or the nature of regulation.
This is generally true globally as well.
All were taken in by the allure of securitized products in various
ways.
The shock was to the entire global industry, not so much to
particular ﬁrms.
How can we prevent an entire industry from adopting the same
strategy?
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THE FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE
The crisis encompassed a far larger segment than just
commercial banking.
We need to think in terms of the ﬁnancial landscape.
Many non-bank ﬁnancial ﬁrms, outside the banking sector, were
at the heart of the crisis.
These ﬁrms were not regulated by the Fed.OVERVIEW ORIGINS SHADOW BANKING A “WALL STREET ONLY” FED A BROAD FED ROLE PROPOSALS CONCLUSIONS
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COMMUNITY BANKS
Regulation works well for the thousands of community banks in
the U.S.
The system features deposit insurance plus prudential
regulation.
The system allows failure—capitalism at work—but prevents
bank runs and the associated panic.
Community banks did not cause the crisis and do not need to be
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THE FED AND COMMUNITY BANK REGULATION
Some regulatory proposals seek to create a “Wall Street only”
Fed.
The Fed should remain involved with community bank
regulation so that it has a view of the entire ﬁnancial landscape.
It is important that the Fed does not become biased toward the
very large, mostly New York-based institutions.
One critical role of regulation is to provide a level, competitive
playing ﬁeld for institutions of all sizes.
Community banks tend to fund smaller businesses, an important
source of job growth for the economy.
Understanding this process helps the Fed make sound monetary
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MAIN THEME
The Fed had access to a limited view of the ﬁnancial landscape
coming into the crisis: that for which it had supervisory
authority.
This made it harder to perform the lender of last resort role.
This led to a lot of ad hoc decision-making.
The Fed will again play the lender-of-last-resort role in the next
crisis.
This will go much more smoothly if the Fed has broad regulatory
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THE FED AND BANKING SUPERVISION
The U.S. has a primary regulator system for the nation’s 8,000+
commercial banks and thrifts.
The primary regulator has the key authority for the regulation of
the bank.
Before the crisis (as of January 2007):
The Fed had primary regulatory responsibility for about 12 percent
of the banks.
About 14 percent by assets.
The remaining 85 percent of the banks had non-Fed primary
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THE FED HAD LIMITED INFORMATION
Non-bank ﬁnancial ﬁrms turned out to be the most troublesome
entities in this crisis.
The Fed had no supervisory authority over these entities:
Investment banks like Goldman Sachs and Bear Stearns.
Insurance companies like Prudential and AIG.
Financial hybrids like GE Capital and GMAC.
The Fed had access to limited information coming into the crisis:
Primary regulatory authority for only some of the banks, and none
for the troublesome non-bank ﬁnancials.
Bottom line: Due to its narrow regulatory authority, the Fed had a
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THE CRISIS UNFOLDS
As the crisis began, all eyes turned to the Fed as the lender of last
resort.
This always happens in a crisis—only the central bank can play
the lender-of-last-resort role.
But the Fed had detailed knowledge only of part of the ﬁnancial
landscape: that for which it had supervisory authority.
The Fed had limited access to information on institutions outside
its supervisory authority, especially non-bank ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
Many of the critical lending decisions involved the controversial
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THE REFORM RESPONSE
The clear lesson from the most recent crisis is that the Fed had
insufﬁcient access to information about the ﬁnancial landscape
going into the crisis.
Neither the Fed nor anyone else fully understood the potential
for feedback between the ﬁnancial sector and the rest of the
economy.
The Fed will be at the center of all future crises because of its
lender-of-last-resort role.
The central bank must be well-informed about the entire
ﬁnancial landscape in order to face off a future crisis.
The reform response should be to provide the Fed with an
appropriately broad regulatory authority.
A future Fed, with an appropriately broad regulatory responsibility,
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SYSTEMIC RISK
The House bill creates an interagency Financial Services
Oversight Council (FSOC) to monitor systemic risks posed to the
ﬁnancial system.
In the House bill, the Federal Reserve would serve as the “agent”
to the Council and not as the systemic risk regulator.
Other debate has suggested investing the Council with more direct
authority.
Would this prevent a future crisis? I think the evidence is far
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MORE ON SYSTEMIC RISK
Not likely that this Council, had it existed in the past, would
have advocated aggressive action to control systemic risk.
It seems like it would be difﬁcult for an interagency Council to
come to agreement on a speciﬁc risk and an associated action
when times are good.
The role of the Council would be to “take away the punch bowl
as the party gets started.”
This type of decision may be better suited to the Fed.
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A RESOLUTION REGIME
In the House bill, the FDIC is granted expanded authority to put
systemically important ﬁrms into receivership.
Other debate has suggested a special bankruptcy court for large
ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
Would this prevent a future crisis? It might.
This reform goes in the direction of strengthening market
incentives.
A resolution regime is a way of putting market discipline on
very large ﬁnancial ﬁrms—we really could allow failure without
creating panic.
The fear of failure would then prevent ﬁrms from taking
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A RESOLUTION REGIME: KEY CONCERNS
Key concern: How credible will the regime be?
If it is not credible and the government is going to come in after
all, then it is useless.
“Funeral plans” for the ﬁrm in the event of failure do not strike me
as credible.
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RESTRICTIONS ON 13(3) LENDING
In the House bill, signiﬁcant restrictions are placed on Fed
lending to non-banks under the “unusual and exigent
circumstances” clause.
Would this prevent a future crisis? No.
This will probably exacerbate a future crisis.
A future Fed may be hamstrung and forced to let the crisis roll
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CONSUMER PROTECTION
The House bill creates a separate Consumer Financial Protection
Agency (CFPA) with rule-writing authority for all banks and
non-banks that extend consumer credit.
This has been very controversial in the Congress.
Other debate has suggested putting this in agencies other than the
Fed.
Would this prevent a future crisis? I don’t think so.
A fair playing ﬁeld is certainly desirable in all consumer
products.
But the housing boom was a classic gold rush: most people
bought the houses because they thought the prices would keep
rising.
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SINS OF OMISSION
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CONCLUSIONS
As the nation’s lender of last resort, the Fed will be at the center
of managing any future ﬁnancial crisis.
This argues for the Fed playing the lead role in the new
regulatory structure.
A Fed with appropriately broad regulatory authority provides the
nation with the best chance of avoiding a future crisis.
Only a few of the current ﬁnancial regulatory reform proposals
are likely to help prevent future crises.Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
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